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Since the development of the installment sales contract,1 waiver of
defense clauses have been used in consumer finance transactions to
provide banks and finance companies with a freedom from contractual
defenses equivalent to that enjoyed by the holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument.2 Consumers who finance purchases by means
of an agreement containing such a clause waive the right to raise
against an assignee of the contract any claim of defense to payment
that they might have against the seller-assignor.
The operative consequences of a waiver of defense clause become
most apparent to the consumer when he discovers that he has purchased
defective merchandise from a merchant who ignores legitimate re-
quests for refund or cure.3 The most effective self-help weapon a
consumer debtor possesses is his refusal to make further payments on
the goods until his complaints have been satisfied. In signing a con-
tract containing a waiver of defense clause, the consumer foregoes
this leverage. He agrees to make full payment to any subsequent as-
signee regardless of the merchant's failure to perform his contractual
obligations, however willful or outrageous the seller's conduct may
be.4 At this point the only remedy available to the buyer is a lawsuit
against the merchant--a remedy which, in the context of consumer
transactions, rarely provides effective relief. Not only does the expense
of litigation generally exceed the amount which the buyer can hope
to recover, but many merchants who regularly engage in fraud and
1. For a general discussion of the development of waiver of defense clauses and the
judicial reaction to their use in consumer financing, see Gilmore, The Commercial Doc-
trine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1093-1102 (1954).
2. Under the UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.], as
under prior law, a holder in due course takes a negotiable instrument free from all
defenses of any party to the instrument with whom he has not dealt, except "real"
defenses such as infancy, duress And fraud in the factum. While the literal terms of
most waiver of defense clauses would cover even these defenses, most courts havc per-
mitted "real" defenses to be raised in spite of a waiver clause. See, e.g., Anglo.California
Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922) (dictum) and Gilmore, supra note 1, at
1096. U.C.C. § 9-206(1) continues this rule. See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121l, § 518 (Supp.
1972).
3. See generally Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor.Orientated View-
point, 68 COLU.M. L. REv. 445, 472 (1968):
The one thing certain about the typical consumer's execution of a purchase contract
with a waiver of defense clause is that he is unaware of the consequences of signing.
4. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effectwe Pro-
grams for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966), for a typical scenario.
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deception may have arranged their affairs so as to be virtually judg-.
ment proof.
As a result of mounting pressure5 for corrective action and more
than a few spectacular instances of abuse,0 the use of waiver of defense
clauses in installment sales contracts is now prohibited, or strictly
regulated, in a majority of states.7 The Federal Trade Commission
5. No single aspect of consumer credit causes more outrage to consumer spokes.
men and insistence on statutory change ....
H. KRIPrE, CONSUMER CREDIT 230 (1970).
Virtually every forum in the legal system has been an arena for the debate over
waiver of defense clauses. Initial judicial reaction to waiver of defense clauses was
mixed. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216
P. 376 (1923); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922). Later
cases produced the same variance in results. See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 2d 8 (1955); 78
C.J.S. Sales § 641(b) (1952). Compare Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150,
148 N.E.2d 385 (1958), with First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 I1. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d
780 (1965). For a history of the judicial response, see Gilmore, supra note 1, at
1093-1102.
During the 1950's, the drafting of the U.C.C. became the focus of the debate. The
earliest drafts of § 9-206 prohibited the use of waiver of defense clauses in all con-
sumer transactions. However, such pro-consumer provisions were successfully repelled
by banks and finance companies. See 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 293-94 (1965). A similar battle was also waged over the UNIFORM CONSUMlER
CREDIT CODE [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.]. The earliest drafts of the U.C.C.C. flatly
prohibited the use of waiver of defense clauses. An attack by financial interests once
again forced the pro-consumer draftsmen to retreat. Compare § 6,102 (First rent. Draft
1966) with § 2.404 (Official Text 1968). See Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel":
Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales,
29 OHIo ST. L.J. 667, 680-85 (1968).
The pages of legal periodicals have served as a third battlefield. Among the more
recent articles and notes which have taken up the gauntlet are Hogan, Integrating the
UCCC and the UCC-Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and Practices, 33 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROD. 686 (1968); Note, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut'Off Devices
in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 505; Navin, Waiver of Defense Clauses in
Consumer Contracts, 48 N.CAR. L. REv. 505 (1970); Note, Waiver of Defense Clauses In
Consumer Financing, 15 S.DAK. L. REv. 386 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Star Credit Corp. V.
Molina, 59 Misc.2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of
America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965).
7. Legislation or judicial decisions currently prohibit, or greatly restrict, the use of
waiver of defense clauses in at least twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia.
They are made wholly unenforceable by statutes in the following sixteen states: ALA.
CODE, Laws 1971, Act. No. 2052, § 5(a) (1 CoNsUMIER CREDIT GUIDE Alabama 6009);
ALAS. STAT. § 45.10.140 (1962); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1804.2 (West Supp. 1971); ci. 207,
§ 1 [1971] Colo. Acts 790, 798 (adding CoLo. REV. SrAT. § 73-2-403(2)); D.C. CODE § 28-3808
(Pub. L. 92-200, 85 Stat. 665, Dec. 17, 1971); HAWAU REV. LAWS § 476-18(b) (1968); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 28-32-404 (Supp. 1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255D, § 25A (Supp. 1971); cit.
275, § 4 [1971] Minn. Acts 449 (adding MINN. STAT. § 325.941); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 97.275
(1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. 50-16-5(f) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403(3)(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-09 (1960) (see C.I.T. Corp. v. I-letand, 143
N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1966)); ORE. REV. STAT. § 83.150 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. 70-B.-2-404
(Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (1971); WASH. REV. CODE 63.14.150 (1966).
Judicial decisions prohibit the use of waiver of defense clauses in four additional states:
Connecticut, Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969);
Kansas, Dearborne Motors Credit Corp. v. Neel, 184 Kan. 437, 337 P.2d 992 1959;
Missouri, Progressive Finance & Realty Co. v. Stempel, 231 Mo. App. 721, 95 S.W.2d 834
(1933); Industrial Loan Co. v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); New Jersey,
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
Waiver of defense clauses are regulated and made enforceable only as to claims not
raised within a specified period of time after the buyer receives notice of assignment In
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may soon universalize the prohibition b" declaring the use of these
clauses an unfair trade practice.8
Nevertheless, over 9,000 banks throughout the United States cur-
rently finance consumer purchases by means of credit card agreements
containing waiver of defense clauses." The effect of these clauses is
exactly the same as those which appear in installment sales contracts,
yet the credit card agreements have been drafted in a manner which
places them beyond the scope of most statutory restrictions.1 0
Until recently, this discrepancy between the legal restrictions placed
on installment sales contracts and the laissez-faire attitude accorded
to bank credit cards has not been a matter of great concern."1 Since
bank credit cards are rapidly becoming the dominant means of fi-
eight states: Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-145(A) (Supp. 1971) (90 days); DEL. CODE AN.
tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp. 1970) (15 days); IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-22-404 (Burns Supp. 1971) (60
days); MICH. Coup,. LAws ANN. § 445.865 (1967) (15 days); OrL4. STAT. tit. 14A § 2-404
(Supp. 1971) (30 days); PA. STAT. tit. 69, § 1402 (Supp. 1971) (45 days); T-x. REv. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.07 (1971) (50 days); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-404 (Supp. 1971) (45
days).
8. 36 Fed. Reg. 1211-12 (1971). Hearings on the proposed trade regulations were held
in 1971 but a decision has yet to be announced. 4 CoNsusra Caanrr GumE, Report No.
78 (Oct. 12, 1971).
9. As of June 80, 1971, the Interbank Card Association (Master Charge) and the Bank
of America reported that 9366 banks were associated with their respective credit card
systems. Both require the use of waiver of defense clauses in contracts drafted by member
banks. American Banker, August 19, 1971, at 6, col. 3. This figure represents nearly
sixty-seven per cent of the 14,000 commercial banks in the United States and does not
include numerous banks which issue credit cards independent of the two major systems.
10. See Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. &
Co?. L. REv. 485, 511 (1967). Generally, the statutes prohibiting the use of waiver of
defense clauses are drafted in language applicable only to instruments in which the
waiver clause is made operative by means of assignment. See, e.g., N.Y. PERs. Pziop. LA.1w
§ 403(3)(a) (McKinney 1971 Supp.):
No retail installment contract of obligation shall contain any provision by vwhich
the buyer agrees not to assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of
the sale.
See also U.C.C.C. § 2.404 (Official Text).
In the vast majority of credit card agreements, the consumer's obligation to make
payments to the issuer bank is phrased in terms of a direct obligation rather than an
assignment from a merchant. By incorporating the waiver of defense clause in its con-
tract with the cardholder, rather than in a merchant-consumer agreement (where it
appears in installment sales contracts), the issuer bank is able to cut off consumer de-
fenses without relying on the device of assignment.
A rare exception to this direct obligation format is the credit card agreement de-
scribed in Clontz, Bank Credit Cards Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 B.FI.G
L.J. 888 (1970). It was drafted on an assignment model for use in North Carolina. one
of the states which has never placed restrictions upon the use of w.aiver of defense clauses.
Three states have recently enacted legislation specifically dealing with the use of
waiver of defense clauses in credit card agreements. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-145(A)
(Supp. 1971); ch. 1019, § 4 [1971] Cal. Acts 2152-55 (adding CA. Civ. CODE- 1747.90);
MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1971).
11. See Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 CoLut. L. RE,. 375, 400.01
(1971). The use of waiver of defense clauses in credit card agreements mas first noted
in Bergsten, supra note 10, at 509-17, where the author "ruminated" over some of the
problems raised, but reached no clear conclusions. See also Navin, supra note 5, at 551,
where the author describes his discovery of the clause in his credit card as a "puzzle-
ment," and exclaims "how about that?"
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nancing consumer purchases,' however, the inconsistency can no
longer be ignored.'3
In view of the widespread efforts to abolish the use of waiver of
defense clauses in installment sales contracts and other assignment-
type consumer financing, this Note will examine the desirability of
their elimination from credit card agreements as well. Rather than
add to the painstaking efforts to characterize credit card transactions
in terms of existing legal doctrines and definitions, 4 this Note will
concentrate on a more functional analysis of credit cards and the
practical effect of waiver of defense clauses. The view which the law
should take of credit card transactions and merchant-consumer dis-
putes can be best informed by an analysis of underlying economic
realities.
12. According to Federal Reserve System statistics, as of August 31, 1971, approximately
$3.2 billion of installment credit was outstanding on bank credit card accounts alone.
This figure represents thirty-five per cent of the consumer goods installment credit held
by commercial banks, other than automobile financing. Federal Reserve System, Con-
sumer Credit, Statistical Release G. 19 (Oct. 4, 1971).
13. In addition to the three statutes described in note 10 supra, bills prohibiting the
use of waiver of defense clauses in bank credit cards were introduced in at least one
other state legislature and the Congress during 1971. See S. 6483-A, N.Y. Legis., 1971-72
Reg. Sess. (April 22, 1971); S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 169 (1971).
14. Ever since August 1960 when Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction.
A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (1960), first asked whether the tripartite credit
card transaction more resembled a letter of credit or the assignment of accounts re-
ceivable, an endless array of legal commentators have unsuccessfully sought to pigeon-
hole bank credit cards in terms of one or another familiar legal device. See, e.g., Daven-
port, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 85 BANKING L.J. 941 (1968):
Comment, Credit Cards-A Survey of the Bank Credit Card Revolution and Applicability
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 389 (1967); Comment, Commercial
Transactions: Section 9-206 and Its Applicability to the Tripartite Credit Card, 21 OKtA.
L. REV. 59 (1968); Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to Mod-
ern Bank Card Systems, 18 KAN. L. REV. 871 (1970); Note, Waiver of Defense Clauses in
Three Party Consumer Credit Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 99 (1970).
Brandel & Leonard, Bank Credit Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 Mic. L, RV,
1033 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brandel & Leonard] is the most recent effort. Devoting
fully twenty-five pages to such analogies and characterizations, they conclude at one point:
The multiparty bank charge card transaction appears to be a hybrid of the travel-
er's or "clean" letter of credit and the commercial or documentary letter of credit,
although it more closely resembles the latter.
and later:
The premise upon which to proceed by analogy for the convenience card trans.
action is that of the cash sale. For these transactions, the charge card system . . .
replaces cash.
As to such transactions, the card holder should be in no better, nor worse, position
than if he had paid for his purchase with cash.
Id. at 1046-47, 1061.
U.C.C.C. § 1.301(9) continues this unfortunate trend, analogizing credit card banks
to lenders. The most obvious distinction between unsecured loans and credit card pur-
chases is that the latter can be made only from merchants whom the bank has solicited
to join its system. Even assuming the usefulness of some past analogies, this Note argues
that a functional analysis of bank credit cards is the only coherent way to discuss what
is clearly a new phenomenon, and calls for the abolition of waiver of defense clauses.
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I. Credit Card Contracts
The operational characteristics of bank credit cards are generally
familiar.1 5 The individual bank credit card transaction is a three-sided
arrangement which involves a cardholder, a merchant and a bank. G
The contract between the cardholder and the bank primarily con-
tains an authorization for the bank (issuer) to pay money upon the
presentation of invoices or "sales slips," and the terms under which
the cardholder is to repay the bank for credit so extended. In addition,
a typical "cardholder agreement" 17 also contains a waiver of defense
clause and a provision entitling the issuer to recover all costs incurred
in collecting an indebtedness owed by the cardholder.18
The contract between the merchant and the bank sets forth the
terms under which the bank will accept sales slips presented by the
merchant and, in addition, contains a number of general limitations
on the merchant's business practices.10 Among other typical provisions
contained in "merchant agreements" are two which deserve special
attention. The first gives the bank the right to inspect the merchant's
books and financial records. The second is an agreement which gives
15. The best description of the mechanics of bank credit transactions is Davenport.
supra note 14. The characteristics of bank credit card systems, including the role of
regional clearing centers, are briefly described in Brandel & Leonard, Supra note 14,
at 1034-57.
16. Many bank credit card transactions actually involve two separate banks--one
called the "issuer bank" with whom the cardholder deals and a second called the "de-
pository bank" from which the merchant receives payment. Because the role of the
bank may be split in this manner, it is technically incorrect to speak of bank credit
cards as purely "tripartite" devices. However, almost all credit card banks perform both
functions. Therefore, it is simpler to analyze credit card transactions in tripartite terms,
reserving discussion of the realistic quadripartite model for later. See pp. S00.01 infra.
17. The contract between the cardholder and the issuer bank will be referred to as
the "cardholder agreement," and the depository bank/merchant contract as the "sales
agreement." In situations where two banks are related in an interchange s)stem, the con-
tract between them shall be called the "interbank agreement."
18. Copies of both a cardholder and a merchant agreement used by a Master Charge
bank in the midwest are included in an appendix to Davenport, supra note 14, at 978.86.
Virtually all of the clauses referred to in this Note also appear in that appendix.
19. Typical are requirements that the merchant honor all valid credit cards issued by
banks within the system; that he display promotional material supplied by the bank
advertising his membership in the credit card plan; that he establish a " air" policy
regarding the exchange, return or adjustment of merchandise purchased by credit
cardholders.
A very large number of these contracts also contain a clause by which the merchant
agrees not to discriminate as to price, service or otherwise against any cardholder de-
siring to use his credit card in a transaction with merchant. See, e.g., Davenport, supra
note 14, at 983, clause 13(a). By thus limiting the merchant's freedom to establish his
own prices, such clauses may constitute price-fixing agreements, illegal per se tinder the
antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 US. 150 (1940).
While both the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department are auiare
of the existence and widespread use of such agreements, they have, as yet, failed to take
any action. See Hearings Pursuant to H. Res. 66 Before the Subcouin. on Special Small
Business Problems of the Select House Conin. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 132, 138, 173 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Credit Card Hearings].
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the bank broad chargeback privileges, including the right to recourse
against the merchant in the event a cardholder refuses payment be-
cause of a sale-related defense or claim.
2 0
The relationship between the cardholder and merchant arises from
an exchange of goods or services in return for a sales slip which the
cardholder signs at the time of sale. The sales slip itself is primarily
an evidentiary device, recording the date, nature and amount of the
purchase and identifying the buyer and seller.21 It does not incorpo-
rate any of the terms of the agreement between the cardholder and
merchant, which are either set out in a separate document or left to
be "implied at law."
22
II. Filter Queen
One major objection to the use of waiver of defense clauses or
negotiable instruments in consumer transactions has been that by
insulating banks and finance companies from responsibility for the
20. A typical recourse clause provides:
BANK may refuse to accept any sales slip or revoke its prior acceptance thereof IIn
any one or more of the following circumstances: .. . (b) the cardholder in such sale
disputes his liability to BANK on any one or more of the following grounds: (I) that
the merchandise or services covered by such sales slip were returned, rejected, or
defective in some respect, or MERCHANT agrees to repay BANK the amount
theretofore paid by it or credited to the MERCHANT's account.
This clause is taken from a Master Charge merchant agreement currently used in
Connecticut. Similar clauses appear in virtually all merchant agreements. See, e.g.,
Davenport, supra note 14, at 983, clause 14; Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 400-01 n.l16.
21. Except for those few credit cards designed as assignment devices (see Clontz,
supra note 10), execution of a sales slip does not create any express obligation from
the cardholder to the merchant. Under almost all bank credit cards, the consumer's
payment obligation runs solely to the bank.
The language used on the face of sales slips has changed considerably in recent years,
Older sales slips were apt to be drafted as quasi-negotiable instruments depicting the
consumer/buyer as the "acceptor" of a draft drawn by the seller and made payable to
the issuer bank, or order. It is clear that none of the participants in credit card sales
ever viewed themselves in the manner suggested by the early sales slips. Most sales slips
used today exhibit more candor, merely restating the cardholder's general obligation
as set forth in the cardholder agreement. The operative language of a current Master
Charge sales slip provides:
The issuer of the card identified on the sales slip is authorized to pay the amount
shown as TOTAL upon proper presentation. I [cardholder] promise to pay such
TOTAL (together with any other charges due thereupon) subject to and in ac-
cordance with the agreement governing the use of such card.
The current Uni-Card sales slip contains a complete "Retail Instalment [sic] Credit
Agreement" on its rear side. The Agreement contains, inter alia, a waiver of defense
clause:
Uni-Card is not responsible . . .for disputes regarding goods and services, and such
disputes will be settled by me directly with Member [merchant] without affecting
any indebtedness owing to Uni-Card.
22. Aside from the different nature of the buyer's payment obligation in a credit
card sale, the merchant.cardholder relationship is the same as would exist if it had
been a cash sale. The absence of a written agreement does not change the relationship
which the law implies, concerning warranties made by the seller, or the buyers or
seller's rights and remedies set forth by the Uniform Commercial Code.
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practices of the merchants with whom they deal, these devices have
permitted financiers to relax, or even discard, standards of merchant
conduct and solvency.2 3 Any belief that credit card financing was
immune from similar abuses has been called into question by a case
being litigated in California. Payne v. Filter Queen of Hayward, Inc..24
involves a major credit card bank which financed the sales of an
allegedly undercapitalized corporation which employed door-to-door
salesmen to sell vacuum cleaners.
A list of the techniques allegedly employed by Filter Queen's sales-
men reads like a handbook on consumer fraud.2 , Plaintiffs have claimed
that prospective purchasers were solicited by telephone and told that
they had "won" the right to participate in a drawing for a new auto-
mobile; if they called a certain telephone number, they would receive
an additional $5 cash prize. Persons who called in response to these
representations learned that they would receive the $5 only if they
consented to a home demonstration of the Filter Queen vacuum
cleaner. Among the alleged representations made during the subse-
quent home demonstrations were claims that the vacuum cleaner
would function as an air conditioner and that if the consumer agreed
to purchase the vacuum cleaner, he would receive an "Owner's Divi-
dend Certificate" which would entitle him to a $10 dividend for each
one of his friends who would agree to a home demonstration. Plaintiffs
claim that none of these promises was fulfilled.
Filter Queen originally financed its vacuum cleaner sales by means
of installment sales contracts, which were routinely assigned to a
finance company. This arrangement was discarded when Filter Queen
was solicited and approved by a bank as a member of its credit card
23. Empirical investigations have suggested that the single most important factor in
retail merchant fraud is the ability of banks and finance companies to purchase sales
contracts from merchants without any incentive to inquire into the merchant's practices.
reputation or financial stability. See Comment, supra note 4, at 395. 414. See also FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE DsmScr OF COLUMKA CONSUMER PROcrsCON
PROGRAM 17-18 (1968).
24. Civil No. 384418 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Calif., June 16, 1959). appeal filed,
Civil No. 27751 (Calif. Ct. App. Ist Dist., May 13, 1970). The case is a class action by"
defrauded consumers seeking recission and damages against Filter Queen and the bank
and finance company which had financed its sales. At present the case is on appeal
from a decision granting the bank's motion to dismiss the complaint without leave to
amend because of failure to establish a proper class.
The "facts" of the case as set forth in the text are largely taken from the plaintiff-
appellant's brief. However, most of the allegations concerning Filter Queen's practices
and its involvement with the bank are uncontested.
25. For similar problems arising in the context of waiver of defense clauses and other
cutoff devices, see State v. I.T.M., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Norman
v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A2d 115 (1963); and cases cited,
note 14 supra.
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plan.26 The change in financial arrangements allegedly did nothing
to alter Filter Queen's practices. If a prospective purchaser did not
have a bank credit card at the time of the home demonstration, the
session was extended to allow the salesman to take out an application
on his behalf. Shortly after the bank accepted Filter Queen as a
merchant it allegedly began to receive complaints from its cardholders;
within a month and a half, it terminated its relationship with the
merchant, having already discounted $23,000 worth of vacuum cleaner
sales slips.
After the bank terminated its credit card relationship with Filter
Queen, the company ceased operations and its principals disappeared.
At this juncture, the critical question was one that lies at the heart
of the debate over the use of waiver of defense clauses: who should
bear the loss, the consumer or the bank? Because the use of waiver
of defense clauses in installment sales contracts is illegal in Califor-
nia,27 those consumers who bought under installment contracts have
retained their ability to assert the defenses of fraud and breach of con-
tract against the finance company to which their obligations had
been assigned. Those who used credit cards, however, have no such
protection against their issuing bank. They find themselves in the
unenviable position of being potentially liable to the bank for the
full purchase price of the defective vacuum cleaners.23
III. The Nature of the Problem: Unremedied Losses
A. Sources of Unremedied Loss for Consumers
When a consumer is defrauded in a credit card-financed retail sale,
when he purchases merchandise which proves to be defective, or fails
to receive the goods purchased, he incurs a "loss."29 The ultimate
26. Among the attractions of credit card financing was that the bank would finance
Filter Queen's sales at a discount rate of only 3 per cent. While the record does not
show the rate Filter Queen had been forced to pay finance companies to discount its
installment sales contracts, it was undoubtedly much higher. For example, the discount
rate charged for similar financing in Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc.2d 290, 298
N.Y.S.2d 570, 574 (Civ. Ct. 1969) was 20 per cent.
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.2 (West 1970). California is now one of the three states
which have enacted statutory prohibitions against the use of waiver of defense clauses
in credit card transactions. See note 10 supra.
28. The purchase price was an astonishing $320-345.
29. As used here, "loss" refers to any economic detriment incurred by an innocent
party. Losses are not extinguished by shifting them from innocent consumers to equally
innocent banks. They can only be extinguished or remedied by imposing them on the
party responsible for creating them. In the context of contractual claims arising from
consumer transactions, this party is generally a retail merchant.
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consequence of this loss, however, depends on whether the consumer
can obtain relief from the merchant involved, or from the issuer bank.
If the merchant is willing to refund the buyer's money or provide
some other satisfactory cure, the effects of the loss will be minor and
temporary. The difficult cases are those where the consumer and
merchant are unable to resolve their disagreement.30 While the right
to institute legal action against the merchant is theoretically available,
it rarely provides effective relief. The merchant, for example, may
be insolvent or otherwise unavailable for suit.3 ' Even if he can be
reached by a lawsuit, the expense of litigation often exceeds the
amount of the consumer's claim. 32
In this context, the self-help remedy of refusing to pay the money
still owed on the goods in question has the advantage of limiting the
consumer's loss to the amounts already paid. This device is not only
unaffected by the merchant's insolvency,33 but, since it can be in-
voked by the consumer himself, also avoids non-recoverable attorney's
fees. The effect of such a refusal to pay, of course, shifts the loss to
the bank which financed the sale,34 and this is the institution which
is left with the task of seeking recovery from the offending merchant.3
It is precisely this sequence of events which banks seek to avoid by
placing waiver of defense clauses in cardholder agreements.
30. The threat of a call to the "Better Business Bureau" is virtually a waste of
breath. See Comment, supra note 4, at 401. Since merchants who engage in this kind of
unsavory conduct hardly expect defrauded customers to return for more of the same,
the threat of taking one's patronage elsewhere is equally unavailing.
31. Consumer fraud cases are notable for the frequency with which the guilty iner-
chant is insolvent or has disappeared. See, e.g., Gross v. Appelgren. 467 P.2d 789. 790
(Colo. 1970) (insolvent); Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 546, 264 A.2d
547, 548-49 (1969) ("unable to get in touch'); Unico v. Owen, 50 NJ. 101, 109, 232 A.2d
405, 409 (1967) (insolvent); Westfield Investment Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 590,
181 A.2d 809, 818 (1962) ("disappeared'); Norman v. Worldwide Distributors, Inc., 202
Pa. Super. 53, 56, 195 A.2d 115, 117 ("now nowhere to be found').
32. The average amount of an individual credit card sale is approximately $20.
Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 104. See also Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14,
at 1060. The cost of hiring an attorney for even the most limited purposes far exceeds
this amount.
At present only a handful of states have legislation which gives the consumer the
right to recover legal expenses upon successful prosecution or defense of a lawsuit
arising from retail sales. see, e.g., CAL. CtVL CODE § 1811.1 (West Supp. 1971); DE.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4344 (Supp. 1970).
33. As used here and throughout this Note, "insolvency" is generally meant to in-
clude all instances in which a party is judgment proof or otherwise unavailable for suit.
34. If the merchant himself had financed the sale, the consumer's refusal to pay
would have the effect of extinguishing the loss. However, self.financing is generally
limited to large retail chains which have large amounts of capital. Since these large
stores rarely make a practice of engaging in fraud or refusal to satisfy legitimate con.
sumer complaints, discussion of such bilateral transactions is not undertaken here.
35. The bank or finance company would be free to sue the consumer rather than
the merchant. Absent waiver of defense clauses, however, the bank would be subject to
any defenses that could be raised against the merchant, and a suit against the consumer
would be unlikely unless the merchant was insolvent or othenise unavailable.
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B. Allocating Unremedied Losses
Obviously, the elimination of waiver of defense clauses would
greatly benefit the consumer, but what about the bank? Shifting a loss
from one innocent party to another is socially beneficial in at least
two general situations: (1) where the party upon whom the loss is
placed is better able to bear its consequences through spreading30 and
(2) where the party upon whom the loss is placed is better able to
deter such costs from arising in the future.37 In the context of con-
sumer transactions, banks and other financiers are invariably better
able than individual consumers to spread losses among a large number
of people.3 8 Of equal importance is the fact that banks also fit the
second criterion of cost allocation. They enjoy a comparative advan-
tage both in obtaining effective relief from losses, and, in many
instances, in preventing their occurrence in the future.
When a credit card merchant presents a sales slip to the bank, its
account is credited with the face value of the instrument less a small
discount to cover administrative costs. If the cardholder later refuses
to pay the bank because of some defect in the merchant's performance,
the bank can either absorb the loss or recover the money credited to
the merchant. Banks and consumers differ substantially, however, in
the amount of leverage they can exercise against merchants. Among
the devices available to the banks are the recourse agreement, the
right to set off losses against a merchant's account, control over a mer-
chant's credit rating, and the ability to screen insolvent and dishonest
merchants out of the credit card system.
Merchant agreements used by credit card banks invariably include
recourse provisions, under which the merchant is obligated to repur-
chase any credit card sales slip the payment of which is disputed by
a cardholder on the basis of defects in the underlying sale. 0 By itself,
36. Such interpersonal loss spreading has two advantages: (1) the taking of a large
sum of money from one person is more likely to lead to costly economic dislocations
than the taking of a series of small sums from many people, and (2) even if total
dislocations are not reduced by spreading, many small losses are preferable to one large
one because people may feel less pain if many lose one dollar instead of one losing many
dollars. G. CALABmi., THE Co-r oF ACCIDENTS 39 (1970). In the case under discussion,
the losses imposed on the bank could be spread among the many users of credit cards;
many small losses would replace relatively fewer larger losses.
37. In Calabresi's terminology, this is the search for the cheapest cost avoider. Id. at
136-73.
38. In addition to interpersonal loss spreading, banks are better able to obtain inter.
temporal spreading by means of insurance. While insurance is theoretically available to
individual consumers, it is reasonable to assume that it would be more expensive to
consumers, if for no other reason than that their loss experience is more limited. id.
at 251-53.
39. See p. 292 and note 20 supra.
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a recourse agreement is not substantially more effective against a re-
calcitrant merchant than a consumer's cause of action for breach of
contract or fraud. If banks were compelled to sue merchants to obtain
compliance with the terms of a recourse agreement, litigation costs
would present a real barrier to effective relieL40 Banks, however, are
rarely forced to sue.
First, the ongoing relationship between a credit card bank and its
merchants permits the bank to quickly and easily remedy losses by
setting off disputed amounts against any balance the merchant has in
his checking account or against sales slips which the merchant pre-
sents.4 1 Credit card merchants are required to maintain an account
with their bank, into which they deposit sales slips. Any balances re-
tained in such accounts are subject to set-off.
4 2
Even if the merchant maintains an insufficient balance in his ac-
count, credit card merchants, usually hold one or two days' worth
of sales slips that they have not yet presented to the bank for payment.
These represent a debt owed to the merchant by the bank. Should
a merchant balk at repurchasing a contested sales slip, the bank can
obtain immediate relief by setting off the disputed amount against
any sales slips the merchant may attempt to present.
While the ability to set off disputed amounts is an extremely simple
and effective remedy, it is not the only weapon available to the bank.
Unlike consumers, banks enjoy considerable leverage over merchants
through their ability to affect adversely a merchant's credit rating.
Rather than risk impairment of his access to continued financing, a
merchant who expects to remain in business very long will rarely refuse
to repurchase a disputed obligation.
The bank's leverage may fail to provide relief in the event of
merchant insolvency. While banks can use their debtor position to set
off sales slips which cardholders refuse to pay prior to the time the
merchant goes out of business, losses which arise from consumer de-
fenses raised subsequent to insolvency are bound to go unremedied.
Even here, however, banks can minimize unremedied loss resulting
from insolvency by refusing to deal with high-risk merchants. And,
40. Of course the barrier might not be as high as that faced by consumers if banks
retain house counsel and hence have smaller costs in pursuing particular claims. Since
this seems probable, even a system which allocated the initial loss on banks and forced
them to sue merchants would be somewhat superior to one which left to consumers
the burden of commencing a lawsuit. See note 49 infra.
41. While the discussion in the text assumes a single bank, tripartite model, it would
be equally applicable to two bank, quadripartite transactions.
42. See note 20 supra. See also 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970) (right to set-off in bankruptcy).
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unlike consumers, banks need not rely on external appearances as the
sole indicia of a merchant's financial stability. They not only have
access to a merchant's financial records, 43 but they possess expertise
and experience in evaluating them. Banks continually use credit in-
formation, balance sheets and other financial data to make solvency
predictions in connection with direct loans. Placing the risk of mer-
chant insolvency on banks by a prohibition of waiver of defense
clauses would encourage them to use the same care in screening mer-
chants for credit card plans as they now use in selecting borrowers.' 1
While banks are generally not in the business of evaluating mer-
chant conduct, they are not completely helpless in screening dishonest
merchants out of their credit card systems. Each credit card bank has
many local cardholders who deal with its merchants on a daily basis.
As a result, knowledge of a merchant's fraudulent or irresponsible
practices will quickly be brought to the bank's attention by cardholder
complaints.4
5
By employing their potential leverage, banks possess the ability to
minimize the two primary sources of unremedied losses in consumer
transactions: litigation costs and merchant insolvency. For this reason,
shifting the risk of loss to banks should serve to substantially reduce
the extent of unremedied loss. The undesirable effects of any unreme-
died losses that did arise would be minimized because losses would
be imposed on the party best able to spread their effects.
IV. The Problem of Overreaching by Consumers
The elimination of waiver of defense clauses clearly would minimize
the incidence and effect of litigation costs and merchant insolvency
as sources of unremedied consumer losses. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether abolition would also permit unscrupulous cardholders
43. See p. 291 supra.
44. For example, it is inconceivable that the United California Bank would have
given Filter Queen an unsecured loan of $23,000 in view of the merchant's under-
capitalized financial structure. But the bank evidently did not have the same qualms
about signing up Filter Queen as a member of its credit card plan and, in effect,
loaning Filter Queen 23,000 of its cardholders' funds. Credit card banks assert that
they carefully evaluate merchants for purposes of determining their honesty and repu.
tation in the community. Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 184. Thus, there
would be little additional cost involved in assessing the merchant's financial condition
as well.
45. In spite of their access to information regarding merchant practices, the present
allocation of the risk of loss gives banks little incentive, other than cardholder goodwill,
to make use of it. For an example of an issuer's failure to get rid of even notoriously
fraudulent merchants because they were "good customers," see Credit Card Hearings,
supra note 19, at 209.
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to raise so many unfounded claims that a significant new source of
unremedied losses would enter into the system.
If a bank exercises recourse against a merchant on the basis of an
unjustified cardholder claim, a loss will be imposed on the merchant
analogous to that incurred by a defrauded consumer. Like the de-
frauded consumer, the innocent merchant may be confronted with
two barriers to effective relief--consumer insolvency and litigation
costs. Unlike the situation imposed on consumers by waiver of de-
fense clauses, however, these barriers to relief for the merchant are
relatively slight.
Consumer insolvency may present less of an obstacle to recovery by
a merchant against whom recourse was unjustly exercised. Banks al-
ready engage in some screening of potential cardholders to insure that
they represent good credit risks.40 Because a system which abolished
waiver of defense clauses in credit card transactions would create an
incentive for banks to conduct this screening with care, merchants
would be largely protected by the banks' self-interest in avoiding
judgment-proof defendants. 47
Merchants are similarly protected against litigation costs as a source
of unremedied loss by the costs of collection clauses that are incor-
porated in credit card agreements.48 Besides protecting the merchant,
these clauses serve as an important check on the assertion of fictitious
claims by consumers. By compelling a bank to exercise recourse on
the basis of an unfounded claim, a cardholder runs a very real risk
that the merchant will sue him and collect the purchase price along
with damages and attorney's fees as well.49 A further deterrent to
frivolous claims is the power of an issuer bank to revoke a litigious
cardholder's credit card.50
Threats of revocation and the prospect of having to pay collection
costs may not completely eliminate unmeritorious refusals to pay on
46. See, e.g., Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 53.
47. Under the present system, it is not in a bank's self-interest to so police merchants.
Since payment to the bank by the consumer is virtually guaranteed by waiver of defense
clauses, banks can collect on credit card sales even when the member merchant goes
bankrupt.
48. See note 21 supra.
49. The system proposed would thus put the burden of commencing litigation on
the party for whom that course of action is cheapest. For a description of merchant
efficiency in the collection process, see Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics
of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1. 22-24 (1970). The strictly economic anal)sis here
necessarily overlooks Left's identification of malevolence as an operatihe factor in any
collection system.
50. Frivolous claims could also be deterred if banks required the pa)ment of a
service charge by cardholders who assert defenses. See p. 303 infra.
The Yale Law Journal
the part of consumers. And, since courts are not infallible, some mer-
chants will be faced with a source of unremedied loss which they did
not face under the waiver of defense system. But slippage of this kind
is inevitable in any remedial scheme. Unless consumers are more apt
to raise unmeritorious defenses than merchants are to reject legitimate
claims, abolition of waiver of defense clauses will not increase the
frequency with which this kind of loss occurs.rl
V. The Four-Party Model
The majority of bank credit card transactions involve two banks,
one which issued the credit card and another with whom the mer-
chant deposits sales slips from credit card sales. The presence of
the additional bank somewhat alters the operational model outlined
above,52 but the superior ability of banks to avoid and remedy losses
in the credit card system remains. In quadripartite transactions the
exercise of recourse involves one additional step, as the issuer bank
must first charge the disputed amount against the depository bank,
which, in turn, looks to the merchant for its remedy. In both the
tripartite and quadripartite models, the bank which has dealt with
a merchant would bear the risk of loss in the event of his insolvency.53
Thus, a credit card bank need only be concerned about the solvency
of the merchants with whom it has directly dealt, not with those who
have another depository bank.
In the absence of waiver of defense clauses, merchant-consumer
disputes in the four-party situation would most likely be resolved in
something like the following manner. Upon discovery of a defect or
other non-conformity in the goods he had purchased, a cardholder
would first turn to the merchant and seek a refund or cure. Aware
of the consumer's leverage inherent in the right to refuse to pay the
bank, the merchant will have a considerable incentive to settle all
51. In this context, see Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 209-10, where the
general counsel of Diners' Club replied to the question, "As between the cardholder
and your customer merchant, who would get the benefit of the doubt?" by stating:
I would always lean to the cardholder. And that is based on experience, because I
find that most cardholders are honest. It is very rare that I can recall in the 20
years or so where I have found that a cardholder concocted a story or did not tell
the truth ....
52. The operational characteristics of the four-party model are set out in Brandel F4
Leonard, supra note 14, at 1035-36.
53. There has been a good deal of confusion on the part of commentators with
regard to this point. See Bergsten, supra note 10, at 516, and Brandel & Leonard, supra
note 14, at 1052-53. In both of these articles, much is made about the impossibility of
an issuer bank evaluating the solvency or business practices of a merchant located three
thousand miles away.
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legitimate complaints. If the cardholder is unable to obtain satisfac-
tion from the merchant, however, and if the cardholder remains con-
vinced of the validity of his claims, he will bring the dispute to the
attention of his bank, the issuer.
54
Depending on the issuer's geographic proximity to the merchant
and the amount involved, it may attempt to mediate the dispute in
the interest of preserving the good will of both parties. While the
depository bank may also become involved in the effort to mediate,
the role that either bank can play is not without limits. Beyond a
phone call or two, there is not much the banks can do to compel a
settlement.55 If the effort at mediation is unsuccessful and the card-
holder remains adamant in his refusal to pay, the banks will have little
choice but to exercise recourse against the merchant. 0
If the merchant is, in fact, guilty of refusal to correct a legitimate
consumer grievance, the system will have simply and quickly extin-
guished what would otherwise have been an unremedied loss. In those
situations where the merchant believes that the cardholder's refusal
to pay was unjustified, he is free to sue the cardholder, protected by a
costs of collection clause.
VI. Limitation on the Right to Assert Claims or Defenses
Credit card transactions typically differ from installment sales in
at least two respects. First, credit cards ate often used to finance rela-
tively small sales. Second, they frequently are used in geographic lo-
cations far from the consumer's home. Both of these differences have
been noted by commentators, either to support the continued enforce-
ment of waiver of defense clauses or to argue that limitations on a
cardholder's right to assert defenses would have to be imposed, should
waiver clauses be abolished.5 7 Some of these limitations have already
begun to appear in statutes.58
54. Some credit card issuers find involvement in the messy details of merchant-con-
sumer disputes an anathema. See Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 182.83. Others
explicitly recognize that they are involved in the business of selling services, and that
settling disputes is part of that business. Id. at 109-10, 141-42.
55. In this situation the only real leverage possessed by the banks is their power to
cut off their relationship with an intransigent cardholder or merchanL
56. If the merchant and cardholder are both customers of the same bank, the bank
may decide to absorb the loss, itself, in order to preserve the good will of both parties.
See Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 110, 185, 209. Of course, suit could be brought
against the consumer, but banks would then be subject to normal defenses.
57. See, e.g., Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14, at 1059-71.
58. See, e.g., ch. 1019, § 4 [1971] Cal. Acts 2152, 2154 (adding CQ,.. Cv. Coor §
1747.90(a)), which contains most of the restrictions sought by bankers:
(a) The right of a card issuer to recover any credit extended through use by the
cardholder of a credit card in making purchases from a retailer shall be subject to
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A. Monetary Limitations
The success of credit cards has been due in part to their ability to
process a large volume of transactions at an extremely low cost through
the use of automatic data processing equipment. Credit card issuers
are able to spread the expense of a credit investigation and of main-
taining a repayment schedule over a large number of consumer pur-
chases.0 9 As a result of such reduced transaction costs, it has been
possible for credit card issuers to extend credit on very small sales.
In view of this, it has been argued that, absent a monetary limitation
on the right of cardholders to assert defenses, the administrative ex-
pense which banks would incur as a result of controversies over minor
amounts would destroy the utility of credit cards.00 It has been pro-
posed that the right of cardholders to assert defenses against payment
to credit card issuers should be limited to transactions involving
amounts greater than $50. 61
Even assuming that the transactions costs associated with the opera-
tion of the recourse mechanism would impose some financial burden
on credit card banks, imposition of a $50 minimum would be an
irrational response. Since the average amount charged on credit card
sales is approximately $20,62 limiting the right to assert defenses to
claims of $50 or more would arbitrarily deny relief from consumer
losses in the overwhelming majority of credit card transactions. One
of the primary reasons for eliminating the use of waiver of defense
clauses in the first place was to provide an effective remedy for smaller
claims, which invariably go unremedied under the present system
because of the expense of hiring an attorney.03
the defenses which the cardholder has as a buyer against the retailer from whom
the cardholder made the purchases if:
(1) The purchase price of the item as to which a defense is asserted exceeds
fifty dollars ($50).
(2) The purchase was made within this state.
(3) The cardholder shall have made a written demand on the retailer with re-
spect to the purchase and attempted in good faith to obtain reasonable satis.
faction from the retailer.
(4) The cardholder gives written notice to the card issuer specifying the retailer,
date of purchase, amount thereof, the goods or services purchased, the nature
of the cardholder's defense with respect thereto, and those acts, if any, that the
cardholder has taken in attempting to obtain satisfaction from the retailer.
Other portions of the statute are set out at note 80 infra.
59. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14, at 1036.37.
60. See Note, 11 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv., supra note 14, at 1000, Brandel & Leonard,
supra note 14, at 1061-62.
61. See Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14, at 1062. The California statute adopts
such a restriction, limiting claims to those of $50 or more. See note 58 supra.
62. See note 32 supra.
63. Brandel and Leonard assert that small credit card transactions are analogous to
cash purchases and that denying cardholders the right to assert defenses arising out of
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A more rational response would be for banks to charge those card-
holders who raise defenses a fee or service charge to cover the opera-
tional costs of processing their claims.04 This charge, which could
hardly exceed a few dollars, would be analogous to that imposed by
banks when payment is stopped on a check.05 It would avoid any
transactions cost effect which might impair the general efficiency of
credit cards, without arbitrarily restricting the vindication of rela-
tively small claims.
B. Geographic Limitations
Credit cards issued by banks associated with one of the major inter-
change systems are honored by merchants throughout the country.
As a result, many credit card transactions involve merchants and
cardholders who are separated by hundreds or thousands of miles. In
transactions in which such geographic dispersion exists, special prob-
lems may arise. Most significant is that merchant-consumer discussion
and settlement of disputes becomes very difficult.
In the eyes of merchants, the utility of credit cards may be dimin-
ished by the prospect of distant cardholders compelling banks to
exercise recourse on the basis of unmeritorious claims. If a New York
cardholder unjustly forces recourse against a California merchant, for
example, the latter faces the burden of collecting money from a buyer
3,000 miles away. While the merchant would enjoy the financial pro-
tection of a costs of collection agreement, he would still be required
to invest a good deal of time and money in the effort. In the case of
small purchases, such considerations might dissuade merchants from
honoring out-of-state credit cards.
In response to this problem, a variety of geographic limitations on
the right of cardholders to assert defenses have been suggested. One
would limit the right to pure tripartite transactions, those in which
such transactions is justified because a consumer would not have been able to assert
a defense if he had paid for the goods in cash. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14, at
1060-61. The same writers advance a similar argument based on an analogy to personal
checks. Id. at 1050-51.
Each of these arguments is a throwback to the "pigeonhole" analysis which has
plagued the legal literature on this subject for so long. See note 14 supra. Analysis should
focus instead on the practical issue of whether permitting cardholders to assert defenses
arising out of small claims would reduce the incidence and extent of unremedied loss.
64. To avoid reform because of "administrative cost" is economically irrational here.
Under the present system, the total unremedied loss, a real cost in itself, is borne by
the consumer. Even if the proposed system involved added administrative costs, it
would be preferable to allow the cardholder to pay those costs directly, rather than
allowing such "transactions costs" to bar relief altogether.
65. Cf. U.C.C. § 4-403 and Official Comment 2.
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both the merchant and the cardholder had dealt with the same bank.00
The Arizona and California credit card statutes limit the right to raise
defenses to transactions made within the state.0 7 Other proposals would
allow defenses to be raised only when the merchant and cardholder's
residence are within a specified distance of one another.08
Each of these suggested limitations is both arbitrary and unrespon.
sive to the underlying problem. Limiting the right to assert defenses
to cases in which only a single bank is involved would deny relief
for losses arising from the majority of credit card transactions which
occur in metropolitan areas. Almost every large city has at least two
credit card banks which are associated with the same interchange
system. It would be irrational to condition effective relief for consumer
losses on the fortuity of a particular merchant and a particular card-
holder banking at the same place.
The use of state boundaries as a limitation on the right to assert
defenses could be equally arbitrary. In California, where such a limi-
tation has been adopted,0 9 a cardholder living in Crescent City, Cali-
fornia, is now permitted to assert defenses based on purchases made in
Los Angeles or San Diego, 800-900 miles away, but is denied the
right for those made across the border in Oregon, less than fifty miles
away.
Limitations based on specific distances would not produce quite
such anomalous results. If a reasonably large radius were selected,
consumers would enjoy, for most of their purchases, the protection
afforded by the right to assert defenses against the issuer bank. But
administration of such a rule would be far from simple, especially
66. See Bergsten, supra note 10, at 516. The Massachusetts statute preserving the right
to assert defenses arising out of credit card transactions apparently imposes such a
limitation. It states that a credit card issuer will be subject to consumer defenses where
"the creditor was the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in the
sale or lease transaction as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the
seller or lessor." MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1971). Literally interpreted,
such a situation exists only in pure tripartite transactions. The only time the "issuer,"
in any given transaction, has a prior agreement with the merchant is where the "Issuer"
also happens to be the "depository bank."
Aside from the other objections mentioned in the text, limiting the right to assert
defenses to tripartite transactions would arbitrarily discriminate against travel and
entertainment credit card issuers, such as Diners' Club and American Express, which
operate solely on a tripartite model. It would subject them to defenses arising out of
international transactions, while in some cases, insulating banks from defenses based on
sales made across the street.
67. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-145(B)(2) (Supp. 1971); ch. 1019, § 4 [1971] Cal. Acts
2152, 2154 (adding CAL. CIv. CODE § 1747.90(a)(2)).
68. See Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14, at 1065-68.
69. See note 67 supra.
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with respect to purchases made at the margin of the circle surrounding
a cardholder's residence.
70
Rather than condition a cardholder's right to assert defenses on
arbitrary boundaries such as these, it might be more rational to re-
quire that the cardholder show that he had returned the disputed
goods to the merchant, where possible,71 and had made a good faith
effort at settlement.72 Such a rule would ensure merchant-consumer
discussion and preserve the possibility of compromise,T" without un-
necessarily limiting the availability of relief for consumer losses. In
effect, the requirement that cardholders return unsatisfactory mer-
chandise -and communicate regarding alleged defects would constitute
a geographic limitation on a sliding scale. Consumers' willingness to
incur shipping costs and other expenses entailed by a good faith effort
at settlement would be proportional to the size of the loss that would
otherwise go unremedied. This solution would tend to cut off relief
in cases where the costs of negotiation are high and where the con-
sumer does not anticipate success. But these factors already operate
to cut off relief. Since the costs which arise as a result of geography
are virtually irreducible except by reducing the number of transac-
tions between remote parties, the consumer becomes the party best
able to reduce the extent of unremedied losses. Those consumers
who do not wish to incur the risk of loss arising from such transac-
tions could simply refrain from using their cards when far from home.
To place these losses on merchants or banks would probably result
70. Because the purpose of a geographic limitation is to assure the possibility of
merchant-consumer discussion the distance should ideally be calculated from the card-
holder's residence rather than the location of the issuer bank. However, since cardholders
often reside at some distance from their credit card bank, the administrative problems
associated with a fixed distance limitation are staggering. For example. an issuer with
1000 cardholders would have to contend with 1000 separate radii which would change
every time a cardholder moved.
Of course, a geographic limit centered on the bank's location would avoid such
dilemmas. But because of the typical dispersal of cardholders, this limitation might
prove as arbitrary as those discussed above.
71. A cardholder himself ought not to be required to return items such as stoves
or refrigerators, at least in cases where the merchant had originally delivered the ap-
pliance to the cardholder's home. In such cases, the requirement of returning the
goods would be satisfied by the cardholder giving notice to the merchant and permitting
the latter to inspect the defective goods.
72. While both the Arizona and California credit card statutes require that written
notice of alleged defects be sent to both the merchant and the issuer, the California
statute expressly requires that the cardholder attempt "in good faith to obtain reason-
able satisfaction from the retailer." Ch. 1019, § 4 [1971] Cal. Acts 2152, 2154 (adding
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1747.90(a)(3)).
73. From the merchant's point of view this is an important protection because it
gives him notice of disputes at a time when he can still do something about settling
them. See Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 86-87.
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in a severe restriction on the utility of credit cards to out of state
residents. This would disadvantage those cardholders who might use
their credit cards out of state without incident, and those who would
prefer to assume the risk of unremedied loss.
C. Limitations on the Extent of Recovery
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code74 and many of the recently
enacted state statutes75 prohibiting the use of waiver of defense clauses
in installment sales contracts limit the right to assert defenses to the
amount owed on the purchase in question at the time the defense is
raised. This limitation has been incorporated into both the Arizona
and California credit card statutes.
76
Such a rule serves an important objective: it provides a measure
of finality in transactions, and reasonably limits a bank's potential
liability at any particular point in time. Even assuming the propriety
of abolishing waiver of defense clauses, some limit to a bank's exposure
is needed.77 Moreover, the rule puts the credit cardholder in a posi-
tion analogous to that of other customers exercising a right of set-off,
by approximating their ability to withhold only amounts equal to the
amount owing on the defective goods.
Limiting the ability to raise defenses to the amount still owed on
a particular purchase penalizes those who promptly pay their bills,
a category that includes many cardholders.7 8 Moreover, such a rule
may involve administrative difficulties. Most credit card plans give
cardholders a thirty to sixty day period after billing in which to make
payments without incurring interest charges.79 Obligations not met
74. U.C.C.C. § 2.404 (Official Text).
75. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403(6) (McKinney Supp. 1971):
The assignee of a retail installment contract or obligation shall be subject to all
claims and defenses of the buyer against the seller arising from the sale notwith-
standing any agreement to the contrary, but the assignee's liability under this sub-
division shall not exceed the amount owing to the assignee at the time the claim
or defense is asserted against the assignee.
See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 18042 (West Supp. 1971).
76. Axiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-145(A) (Supp. 1971); ch. 1019, § 4 [1971] Cal. Acts
2152, 2154 (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.90(b)).
77. A bank's potential loss on any credit card transaction is already limited to the
amount of the original purchase price plus service or interest charges. See, e.g., First Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Kennedy, 95 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Iowa 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 194
F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1952); McGraw Edison Co. v. Haverluk, 130 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1964). Ab.
sent collusion between a bank and merchant, this limitation is both just and necessary. If
banks were liable for personal injuries caused by defective products, they would be
forced to abandon the field of consumer financing.
78. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14, at 1060.
79. Strictly speaking, the "grace period" itself is generally twenty-five days after
billing. But the effective period for interest free payment must also include the interval
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within this grace period are consolidated into a single revolving loan.
If consumer defenses are to be limited to amounts owed at the time
the defenses are raised, it becomes necessary to allocate later installment
payments and merchandise credits among a series of purchases and
interest charges.80
Another method of achieving a similar limitation on claims would
be to place an explicit time limit on the cardholder's ability to raise
defenses."' Such a limit could take a number of forms. One possibility
would be to have a pure period of limitation for raising consumer
claims-for example, thirty or sixty days after the purchase. A second
alternative would be to entertain only those claims raised at the first
payment date after the defect is discovered. The pure time limit has
the advantage of providing certainty as to liability on the part of the
bank, while the second alternative would be a superior protection of
consumer claims. Although it is difficult to recommend either of these
varieties of time limitation without further study, this approach to
limiting the extent of recovery might well entail lower administrative
costs than a rule geared to the amounts still owed on the purchase
giving rise to the consumer complaint.
VII. Conclusion
The abolition of waiver of defense clauses in bank credit card trans-
actions is desirable on several counts. Not only would abolition de-
crease the incidence of unremedied consumer loss, but those losses that
between the date of purchase and the billing, which, with monthly billing, should
average fifteen days. Cf. Credit Card Hearings, supra note 19, at 50.51.
80. See ch. 1019, § 4 [1971] Cal. Acts 2152, 2154 (adding C.L Civ. ConE § 17.17.90(b)),
for one approach:
The amount with respect to which a defense may be asserted under this Section
shall not exceed the amount outstanding with respect to the purchase involved,
and any late charges or finance charges on such amount, determined as of the time
the retailer receives the written demand required from the cardholder pursuant to
paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) or the card issuer receives the written notice from
the cardholder pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), whichever is received
first. For the purpose of determining the amount outstanding, the payments and
credits to the cardholder's account are deemed to have been applied, in the order
indicated, to the payment of:
(1) Late charges in the order of their entry to the account.
(2) Finance charges in order of their entry to the account.
(3) Debits to the account other than those set forth above, in the order in which
each debit entry to the account was made.
81. The Arizona credit card statute contains both an amount limitation and a ninety
day time limit. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-145 (Supp. 1971).
The analogous time limit in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is three months,
U.C.C.C. § 2.404 (Alt.B.), although some of the states which have adopted the code
have substituted shorter periods. See, e.g., L'. STAT. ANN. § 19.22404 (Burns Supp. 1971)
(60 days).
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did occur would be placed on the institutions best able to spread
them. This Note suggests that these results could be achieved at little
real cost to credit card banks.
This Note has suggested only tentatively how credit card systems
would operate in the absence of waiver of defense clauses. Much re-
mains to be further explored, particularly with respect to geographic
and monetary limitations on the right of recovery. Because both factual
and policy questions exist, legislative study of the problem is clearly
needed. While abolition of waiver of defense clauses has heretofore
been limited to state statutes, the nationwide use of bank credit cards
suggests that federal legislation may be preferable. In the absence of
legislative reform, courts can, as was done in the installment contract
area, declare waiver of defense clauses invalid as contrary to public
policy.8 2 By whatever means, however, abolition of waiver of defense
clauses in bank credit card transactions seems clearly warranted.
82. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969),
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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